Capacity, sustainability, and the community benefits of municipal utility ownership in the United States by Homsy, George C.
Binghamton University
The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
Public Administration Faculty Scholarship Public Administration
9-20-2018
Capacity, sustainability, and the community
benefits of municipal utility ownership in the
United States
George C. Homsy
Binghamton University--SUNY, ghomsy@binghamton.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/public_admin_fac
Part of the Public Administration Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Public Administration at The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been
accepted for inclusion in Public Administration Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The
ORB). For more information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.
Recommended Citation
Homsy, George C., "Capacity, sustainability, and the community benefits of municipal utility ownership in the United States" (2018).
Public Administration Faculty Scholarship. 48.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/public_admin_fac/48
  1 
Capacity, sustainability, and the community benefits of municipal utility ownership in the 
United States 
 
George C. Homsy 
Department of Public Administration 
Sustainable Communities Program 
Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York USA 
Email:ghomsy@binghamton.edu 
Tel: 01-607-777-9184 
 
 
 
Declaration of Conflicting Interests  
I have no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or 
publication of this article.  
 
Funding  
This research was supported in part by a 2014 United States Department of Agriculture, 
Agriculture and Food Research Initiative, Foundational Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Development grant (#2014-68006-21834).  
 
 
  
  2 
 
Capacity, sustainability, and the community benefits of municipal utility ownership in the 
United States  
 
Abstract 
Most literature on utility sustainability focuses on internal operations; this misses the role 
that utilities cold play within a community. This study measures the impact of municipal 
ownership of water and electric utilities on the sustainability policymaking of local governments. 
I find that municipalities with government-owned water utilities adopt more sustainability 
measures than those with investor-owned service. Similarly, municipally-owned electric utilities 
have higher levels of energy sustainability in the community, but not in government operations. 
The utilities provide fiscal and technical capacity to municipalities. This study brings potential 
community benefits to the discussion of private investment in public service delivery. 
 
Keywords: Local government, sustainability policymaking, municipal utilities, electricity, water 
 
Policy Highlights: 
• Municipal ownership of electric and water utilities correlates to increased community water 
sustainability and community energy sustainability.   
• Utilities can provide capacity of local government action on sustainability in the community. 
• Interdepartmental coordination also predicts increased sustainability action by a local 
government. 
 
Introduction 
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Water and electric utilities are intimately tied to sustainability through the nature of their 
services. However, most examinations of the benefits or challenges of such service delivery 
focus on internal operations. For example, local officials may ask if a water provider delivers a 
cleaner product at a lower price? Or how quickly electricity is restored after a blackout? External 
community impacts, such as whether the municipality encourages conservation, are rarely 
figured into calculations of whether services should be delivered publicly or privately.  
At the same time, most local governments in the United States struggle with 
sustainability (Svara, 2011). Capacity is a key constraint of any action by local governments 
(Thompson, 1965) with more complex issues, such as sustainability, requiring more capacity 
(Honadle, 2001). This capacity comes in the form of financial resources or technical expertise. 
Previous studies have found the lack of capacity to hinder environmental protection 
policymaking by local governments (Lubell, Feiock, & Handy, 2009; Sharp, Daley, & Lynch, 
2011). The problem is particularly acute in smaller and rural communities, which do not have the 
resources or political will to act on many sustainability issues (Carter & Culp, 2010; Homsy & 
Warner, 2015).  
Qualitative research in small U.S. cities hints that municipal electric utilities provide an 
important alternative revenue source in support of sustainability efforts in otherwise poorly 
resourced communities (Homsy, 2018). Municipally-owned electric utilities allow citizens to be 
more involved in sustainability discussions, provide local capacity for policymaking, and the 
technical resources needed for implementation (Feiock, Yi, Matkin, & Cartes, 2012; Homsy, 
2016). Other studies similarly suggest that there are important side benefits to the government 
delivery of public services and downsides to private provision. For example, using an index of 
64 local services, Warner and Hefetz (2002) found that an increase in private delivery correlates 
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to decreased levels of civic engagement and increased inequity. Also, in the United Kingdom 
rates of service delivery by the private sector are negatively associated with social equity 
(Andrews & Entwistle, 2010).  
In this paper, I follow-up and expand upon these preliminary investigations about the 
benefits of public ownership of utilities to the greater community using a comprehensive dataset 
of policymaking by municipalities around the United States. In the next section, I examine the 
literature around the internal and external benefits of either publicly- or investor-owned utilities. 
Following the literature review, I present the descriptive results of the national survey and the 
methodology for modeling the impact of utility ownership on community sustainability from the 
perspective of the municipality, which is my unit of analysis. My findings indicate that municipal 
ownership of a water utility positively predicts water sustainability policymaking by that local 
government. The presence of a municipal electric company correlates to increased policymaking 
by a city or town in the greater community. But, it does not predict increased energy 
sustainability policies within local government operations. The study also found cooperation 
among local government departments to be a strong predictor of sustainability policymaking.  
 
Public versus private utilities 
Since the 1980s, the debate over the privatization of public services has spanned both 
ideological and practical spectrums (Sclar, 2000). More than 40 percent of public goods are 
delivered by the private sector (Peters, 2012). Privatization of public services results from 
general opposition to government involvement in the economic sector, belief in the efficiency of 
free markets, and as an easy way to raise large sums of money quickly (Patterson, 2013). The 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund support privatization to raise funds to reduce debt 
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and to alleviate the perceived inefficiencies of public operations (Basu & Miroshnik, 2015). The 
massive financial investment required in aging water systems drives the calls for privatization in 
developed countries, especially in response to increased European or US quality standards (Dore, 
Kushner, & Zumer, 2004; Lieberherr & Fuenfschilling, 2016; National Research Council, 2002).  
Local government leaders in the U.S. make pragmatic decisions around whether or not to 
outsource service delivery (Kim & Warner, 2016). The cost-benefit analysis of privatization is 
situational and based on factors such as community size, structure of local government, market 
conditions, and scale of services provided (Bel & Warner, 2015; Pérez-López, Prior, Zafra-
Gómez, & Plata-Díaz, 2016). In addition to financial considerations, local leaders examine 
whether or not the public or private provision of services, including power and water utilities, 
aligns with the public values and institutions (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006). Public 
officials have to balance a variety of stakeholder values, which traditionally have included issues 
of effectiveness, efficiency, equity, accountability, and service quality. Constraining community 
values are the existing institutions (laws and organizations).  
Within the realm of publicly-owned utility companies, governance structure varies. Many 
operate as city departments (or as sub-units of, for example, a department of public works), 
which report to elected officials. They can also be independent city agencies, city-owned 
corporations, utility districts, or regional authorities (Baer, Edelman, Ingram III, & Mahnovski, 
2001). There also exist various forms of privatization that result in different degrees of 
ownership and risk assumption. For water utilities in the United States, the four most prominent 
are: the outsourcing of specific support services; contracting operations of publicly-owned 
facilities; integrating private design, build, and operation of expanded facilities; and the outright 
sale of facilities to private water companies (National Research Council, 2002).  
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Similarly, regulatory schemes for both public and private utilities vary across countries 
and among states in the United States. Regulation of utilities, since they often involve large 
investments in fixed assets, must protect consumers, who rely on the safe and consistent delivery 
of a service, as well as offer investors (or taxpayers in the case of publicly-owned ventures) the 
assurance that the financial investment will be relatively secure. In the United States, privately-
owned water utilities are regulated for water quality and public health standards by state 
governments pursuant to the national Safe Drinking Water Act (National Research Council, 
2002). Nearly all states also set economic regulations, which control prices and profits of these 
monopolistic operations. In most states, publicly-owned utilities are not subject to economic 
regulations (Beecher & Kalmbach, 2013). Regulation of water service across European nation-
states is similarly decentralized and varied with most countries seeking to deal with operations 
and asset management and pricing (Boscheck, 2013).  
In the U.S., investor-owned electric utilities are governed by rules set out by state utility 
commissions; a few states extend these to publicly-owned utilities. The rules revolve around 
rates and profit controls. Many states regulate sources of power (portfolio standards) often to 
encourage renewable power production. About half of state governments also impose energy 
efficiency standards (Lazar, 2016). Prices vary from state to state within the United States 
depending upon fuel source, regulation, and other factors. This differs significantly from 
electricity governance in the European Union where legislation over the years had sought to 
create an interconnected continent with a convergence of prices and a requirement for the 
universal provision of service to all households (Erbach, 2016). 
 
U.S. Electricity Provision  
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In 2014, the 2,012 electric municipal utilities represented 60.9 percent of all power 
companies in the United States, but provided electricity to only 14.5 percent of customers 
(American Public Power Association, 2017). Although some big cities, such as Los Angeles, 
California, Seattle, Washington, Orlando, Florida, and Austin, Texas have government-owned 
power companies, the vast majority of the publicly-owned electric companies serve 10,000 
customers or fewer. Most of the municipally-owned power companies must purchase power; 
only 31.9 percent produce any of their own electricity and, of those, nearly three-quarters (72%) 
generate five megawatts or less. By contrast, there are 187 invest-owned utilities that provide 
power to over two-thirds (68.3%) of customers in the United States.  
The prime period of growth for government-owned power companies waned in the early 
20th century. Before 1937, the majority of the power in three states and at least 20 percent of 
electricity in 14 others was generated by municipal utilities (Hausman & Neufeld, 2011). Private 
utilities originally focused on large cities, commercial establishments, and the homes of the 
wealthy. Municipal operations emerged to provide power to rural communities and common 
people as well as to counter the growing economic and political clout of the investor-owned 
operations (Rudolph, 2016). Many municipal electric utilities served as money making ventures 
for cities in order to support other operations (MacKillop, 2005).  
The growth of municipal power stopped in the early 1920s and private power companies 
boomed as utilities and their holding companies became a favorite financial instrument. Leaders 
among private power companies and equipment makers colluded to prevent government-owned 
utilities from growing (Granovetter & McGuire, 1998). Private utilities allowed themselves to be 
regulated as a monopoly and this blunted public criticism as people and businesses were 
interested in stable rates and reliable service rather than the battle between public or private 
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operations (Rudolph, 2016). Large electric grids with multiple points of generation became 
technically possible and economically more efficient (Hausman & Neufeld, 2011). This played 
to the advantage of investor-owned utilities because most publicly-owned ones were restricted to 
serving customers within their municipal borders (Rudolph, 2016).  
The number of publicly-owned power companies grew again in the middle of the century 
with the support of Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. However, the private 
companies roared back during the administration of President Dwight Eisenhower, who sought 
to dismantle the federal power projects that favored municipal utilities. In the 1980s, in the U.S. 
rising rates caused by nuclear plant construction incentivized a small number of local 
governments to municipalize their power companies (Rudolph & Ridley, 1986) though the larger 
result was deregulation in many states. More recently, Boulder, Colorado voted to municipalize 
their power system in order to forward their goal of becoming a carbon neutral city (Rudolph, 
2016). However, from about 1983 to 2013 only 59 government-owned utilities formed 
(American Public Power Association, 2013).  
The impact of power companies within communities is not well studied. Nearly all of the 
literature focuses on the environmental or social impact of utility operations. A number of the 
publicly-owned utilities in big cities have established themselves as leaders in renewable energy 
production, though the broad finding that municipal utilities hold more renewable energy in their 
portfolios may be due to investments in hydropower (Heiman & Solomon, 2004). One 
quantitative analysis found that the presence of a municipal utility reduced the community’s 
likelihood having signed the Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement (Krause, 2011) and another 
found that municipal utilities drive community-wide energy sustainability efforts (Homsy, 2016). 
Investments in solar energy by private power companies are negatively correlated to a firm’s 
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financial performance (Ruggiero & Lehkonen, 2017). However, even publicly-owned power 
companies that undertake overseas commercial operations shift away from sustainability values 
to more profit-driven ones when they leave their home countries (Clifton, Fuentes, & Warner, 
2016).  
The most important community benefit discussed in the literature is the potential for 
economic development based upon lower costs of power from municipal electric utilities. From 
the beginning, government-provided power has been cheaper than the electricity from private 
sector operations (Rudolph, 2016). The lower rates are touted as attractive to industries, and 
municipal utilities were often established to encourage economic development and city 
expansion (MacKillop, 2005). The American Public Power Association (2017) compiled data 
showing that in 2014 publicly-owned power companies charged 14 percent less to residential 
customers than investor-owned utilities. The difference in commercial electricity rates is 
narrower: 11.1 cents per kilowatt-hour for customers investor-owned utilities versus 10.7 cents 
for government-owned companies. In a handful states, such as Alaska, California, Connecticut, 
Maryland, and Nevada, public power prices are much lower than those of investor-owned 
utilities. In 12 states, the average publicly-owned rate was slightly above that of investor-owned 
utilities. 
Another advantage noted in the literature is that government-ownership can give citizens 
control over the kinds of power generated. For example, citizen pressure forced municipal 
utilities in Seattle, Washington and Austin, Texas to not participate or to sell off investments in 
nuclear projects (Rudolph, 2016). As a result, these utilities developed aggressive community-
wide conservation programs. Burlington, Vermont’s publicly-owned utility became a leader in 
energy efficiency only after an outcry by citizens. At the same time municipally-owned power 
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companies have better relationships with their customers, which facilitates the increased 
marketing of energy conservation programs (Wilson, Plummer, Fischlein, & Smith, 2008). 
Literature on social sustainability and utilities is thin and usually describes the challenges 
of reaching low income households with energy efficiency. For example, Bird and Hernández 
(2012) find that the split incentive problem, in which renters pay utility bills while landlords 
must bear the costs of energy efficiency improvements, is the main reason that weatherization 
programs have had very low penetration among low income households. In addition, low income 
households have been underserved by utility conservation programs because residents lack the 
money to make initial improvements (Evens, 2015). Over time, the poorer energy customers will 
be bear the burden of increased solar installations, which drive up the fixed costs of power 
production that utilities will pass on to customers (Oppenheim, 2016).  
  
U.S. Drinking Water Provision 
The ownership profile of water utilities is the opposite that of electric companies in the 
United States. While neoliberal reforms have allowed privatization in much of the power, 
transportation, and telecommunications markets, the water sector remains largely a government-
owned operation due to its nature as an essential public good with expensive infrastructure 
requirements and sensitivity to environmental threats (Lieberherr & Fuenfschilling, 2016). 
Although the private provision of water has grown since the beginning of the 21st century 
(Varghese, 2007), by 2014, for-profit companies operated only 46 percent of U.S. water systems 
and served only 12 percent of customers (Food and Water Watch, 2016). Governments owned 51 
percent of the systems while providing drinking water to 87 percent of the U.S. population. 
(These numbers exclude individual systems, usually wells.) From 2007 to 2014 the portion of the 
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population served by municipal utilities rose about three percent. 
Privatization of the aging water systems across developed countries seeks to bring new, 
non-governmental investment in desperately needed infrastructure improvements (Lieberherr & 
Fuenfschilling, 2016). The nature of water makes it a challenging good for privatization as it 
remains inexpensive to customers compared to its value for life and its cost of transportation 
(Solomon, 2011).  In places, fiscal constraints and the devolution of financial responsibilities 
exacerbated the capacity limits facing local governments seeking to upgrade water systems – and 
pushed the hunt for alternatives (Furlong, 2016).  
In the United States, water systems most likely to privatize were in municipalities with 
middle income residents, which may indicate that private suppliers seek communities who can 
afford rate increases, but without significant political influence (Greiner, 2016). In the United 
Kingdom, privatization set off a wave of re-regulation as a backlash to the private operation’s 
environmental and social impacts, such as water service disconnections, cherry-picking of the 
most lucrative areas to provide service, and the increased risks to public health (Lieberherr & 
Fuenfschilling, 2016). However, even public utilities face justice issues, such as in Detroit where 
thousands of low-income families had their water shut off or Chicago where water rates rose 45 
percent over three years (Vanderwarker, 2012). Case studies of utilities in Zurich, Berlin, and 
Leeds indicate a potential tradeoff among the three sustainability dimensions: privately owned 
operations tend to be more economically efficient at the expense of the environment and social 
justice while publicly-owned water utilities sacrifice economic efficiency in favor of the other 
two values (Lieberherr & Truffer, 2015).  
As with electric utilities, the examination of benefits associated with public or private 
ownership of water companies focuses on the operations themselves. Investor-owned water 
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utilities in Europe tend to be more innovative than their public counterparts, but do less in terms 
of sustainability (Lieberherr & Truffer, 2015). Smaller utilities struggle with broad sustainability 
goals due to technical and fiscal limitations as well as lacking access to industry-wide standards 
in areas outside of public health (Haider, Sadiq, & Tesfamariam, 2016). Landis (2015) surveyed 
125 water utilities across North America and, without reporting on differences by ownership, 
found that only 18 percent had a sustainability policy or vision statement and only four percent 
had a sustainability coordinator. Nearly half (46%) employed no internal sustainability metrics. 
Despite the energy intensive nature of most water utility operations, only 30 percent have 
undertaken energy audits or energy conservation strategies. A multi-state study of utilities (n=80) 
in the Midwest, again without differentiating by ownership, found that the vast majority did not 
have rate structures conducive to conservation; 60 percent charged customers lower rates with 
higher water usage and another 31 percent held the rates constant regardless of amount of water 
used with a few more private utilities having such conservation discouraging policies. Just over 
two-thirds of the utilities (71%) provided conservation information to customers. The study also 
found that 11 percent of utilities have discounts for low-income customers; 10 percent have 
senior discounts; and 26 percent offer some kind of payment assistance program (Beecher & 
Kalmbach, 2013).  
 
Measuring municipal utilities and the local sustainability landscape 
The unit of analysis in this study is the local or county government. My measures of the 
community benefits are three additive indices of local government sustainability policies drawn 
from the 2015 Local Government Sustainability Practices Survey conducted with the 
International City/County Management Association. The survey frame consisted of all counties, 
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all municipalities and townships over 25,000 in population and a one in 2.5 sample of 
municipalities and townships with between 2,500 and 24,999 people. The survey was mailed to 
the chief administrative officer of all 8,562 local governments in this universe and had a response 
rate of 22.2 percent with 1,899 counties and municipalities responding. After cleaning returns 
and matching them with U.S. Census data, I ended up with 1,839 observations in the sample.  
 
Dependent variables 
Tables one through three show descriptive statistics for the components of each of the 
dependent variables used in this study. The three dependent variables are additive indices of 
policies adopted by local governments in three areas: water sustainability, energy sustainability 
in local government operations, and energy sustainability in the community. 
 
 
[Insert Tables 1, 2 & 3 about here.] 
 
Independent variables 
The main independent variable of interest is the presence of a municipal utility, based on 
survey questions asking whether or not the respondent’s community owned their own electricity 
or water utility. In model one, which examines the predictors of water sustainability, the 
presence of a publicly-owned water utility is used. In the other two models, I use the presence of 
a publicly-owned electric company. Only 10.3 percent of respondents owned their power 
company while 55.9 percent of water utilities did. I expect that the presence of a municipal water 
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utility or a municipal electric utility will be positively correlated to increased rates of 
sustainability policies adopted by the local government. 
 The second independent variable measures state influence. In the United States, the 
policy options of local governments are limited by the rules of their particular state. Also, many 
states govern the actions of utilities operating within their borders. This variable is an additive 
index of state-level conservation policies and regulations. The state influence score for the water 
model is derived from The Water Efficiency and Conservation State Scorecard (Christiansen et 
al., 2012). The state influence score for electricity policy is a count of climate mitigation and 
energy conservation policies compiled by the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (2011). I 
expect that state influence scores will be positively correlated to sustainability outcomes.  
 The third variable is an indication of whether or not departments within the local 
government cooperate on water or energy sustainability. Sustainability requires collaboration 
across administrative units. The data come from two questions on the 2015 sustainability survey. 
For electricity, the survey asks whether there is cooperation on energy planning. For water, the 
question was about collaboration on stormwater management. I expect that collaboration across 
department silos will increase the sustainability of particular places.  
The fourth group of variables deals with capacity. The property tax dependence variable 
is calculated from 2012 U.S. Census of Government data (property tax revenue / total revenue). 
The council manager variable comes from ICMA records supplemented with additional research 
to fill in missing places. The percent with a bachelor’s degree comes from the 2015 U.S. 
American Community Survey Five-Year Estimates. The percent of communities reporting staff 
dedicated to sustainability comes from the sustainability survey. I expect that all of these 
variables will be positively correlated to sustainability as demonstrated in previous studies.  
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The fifth variable category is metropolitan status. Previous studies have found that urban 
areas will be more likely to have more sustainability policies than suburban and rural areas. 
Finally, I use as control variables population size, population density, and percent of the 
population that identifies as white; all of these come the 2010 U.S. Census. The descriptive 
statistics for these variables are found in Table 4.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Estimation Procedure 
I ran three separate models, one for each dependent variable, to examine the role of the 
presence of a municipal utility and other predictors on local government sustainability 
policymaking. I used the same sample of 1,839 local and county governments for each model. 
The dependent variables are comprised of count data that have an over-dispersed Poisson 
distribution. Therefore, I employed a negative binomial regression model. The likelihood ratio 
test that alpha equals zero is significant confirming that the negative binomial model is a more 
appropriate fit than a Poisson one. Since state governments are the main regulators of utilities in 
the United States, I also controlled for states in order to account for various political 
environments and regulatory effects that would not show up in the state influence score 
independent variable. The results are presented in Table 5 as incident rate ratios, which, in this 
case, means the change in predicted count of policies when the particular independent variable 
increases by one unit.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
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Limitations 
The study has important limitations. First, as previously described, both publicly- and 
privately-owned utilities come in various governance and corporate forms. Testing the impact of 
these structures on financial and sustainability outcomes is beyond the scope of the current study 
and a topic of future research. Second, despite the sample size, a Chi-Square Goodness of Fit test 
indicates that the largest municipalities in the sample (100,000 or more) and the smallest (under 
25,000) are slightly overrepresented while the communities between 25,000 and 99,999 are 
underrepresented. In the sample, 15 percent of communities were principal cities or counties, 54 
percent suburbs, and 30 percent rural communities. Urban and suburban jurisdictions are 
somewhat overrepresented and rural underrepresented. Finally, there is likely a self-selection 
bias towards places that undertake sustainability actions, though this limitation may also 
strengthen the final result as I am testing whether local governments with municipal utilities 
adopt more sustainability policies. The bias towards more sustainable communities may make a 
positive finding more robust.  
  
Drivers of municipal sustainability  
 The main independent variable of interest is whether or not the local government owns 
the water or energy utility. In two of the three models the presence of the municipal utility is 
significant, and it is a strong and positive predictor of increased numbers of municipal policies 
with regards to water sustainability actions and community-wide sustainability actions. It is not 
significant with regards to energy sustainability policies undertaken by the local government, 
such as installing solar panels on government buildings or conducting energy audits of 
government facilities and operations. (See Table 2 for the full list.) The findings confirm the 
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differing role of municipal utilities with regards to municipal electric utilities using a different 
dataset (Homsy, 2016). 
Why might municipal utilities predict increased community-wide policies, but not 
sustainability policies within government operations? First, making government energy 
operations more efficient has a direct impact on the bottom line of any municipality. Although 
some places may have a hard time making initial investments in energy upgrades, the payoff for 
is easy for local leaders to recognize and to tout – with or without a municipal utility driving the 
change. Second, it is relatively easier for government to change its own operations than to work 
on changes in the private sector, where returns from initial public investments may not be 
quickly realized by the local government. Community values around renewable energy and 
conservation can vary dramatically and local leaders must walk a fine line when spending 
municipal funds to support community resident or business sector efforts.  
A third factor might be the need for greater capacity to handle the more complex 
challenge of community-wide energy sustainability. In the second model, which examines 
government energy sustainability, municipal utilities do not play a role, but other capacity 
variables do. Both property tax dependence and the presence of a city manager, two standard 
capacity variables, are only significant in this second model and not the others. This 
juxtaposition between the presence of a municipal electric utility and two standard capacity 
variables provides support for the notion that municipal utilities provide important technical and 
fiscal capacity to carry out a variety of sustainability actions – without a publicly-owned utility 
local governments that do adopt energy sustainability policies in the community rely on other 
avenues of capacity for implementation. The presence of sustainability staff is significant in all 
models, which is consistent with previous research about the importance of this technical and 
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administrative capacity. The percent of the population with a college degree is also significant in 
all of the models, which is common among studies using this as a proxy for citizen capacity. 
Interdepartmental cooperation is significant in the three models. Policy integration across 
administrative silos is theoretically important to sustainability action (Feiock, Krause, & 
Hawkins, 2017). The current effort is the one of the first studies to empirically examine the 
impact of interdepartmental collaboration on sustainability. Perhaps communities more inclined 
to promote sustainability policy also tend to be more collaborative. Also, with their cash flow 
and expertise, municipal utilities may be attractive collaborators around sustainability issues in 
city government. This administrative aspect of sustainability requires more empirical 
investigation.  
The role of the state is not significant in any of the models. This runs counter to previous 
findings (Homsy & Warner, 2015), which indicate that sustainability often requires the state to 
create a political environment conducive to action as well as supply funding and expertise. With 
regards to energy and water utilities, state rules often govern internal operations, for example, a 
minimum amount of renewable power or investment in water conservation measures. The 
narrowness of the dependent variables might explain this deviation from past studies, which look 
at a broader set of sustainability policies. Also, the dataset may be biased towards places that act 
on sustainability, especially on this limited set of policies, and this may cover up any role that the 
state may have in pushing a green agenda.  
The size of a municipality is significant and positive in all three models. Density is 
significant in the energy sustainability in government operations model though the coefficient 
indicates that the size of the relationship is small. The percentage of the population that is white 
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is insignificant in all three models. In the government operations model, suburban and rural 
communities adopt fewer sustainability policies.  
 
The Role for Municipal Utilities 
This study confirms the important role that municipal utilities – both water and energy –  
can have as actors within a community around the issue of sustainability. Local governments, 
after the Great Recession, must find alternative ways to fund the kinds of public services they 
provide (Kim & Warner, 2016). The low rate of sustainability policy adoption (Svara, 2011) 
indicates that local leaders have trouble prioritizing these sustainability values over more 
immediate and traditional quality of life concerns. The challenge is particularly acute in smaller 
communities, which the research shows have harder times adopting sustainability policies and 
the results here indicate may be struggling with both the fiscal and technical capacity.  
Local values may be driving re-municipalization of utilities in Europe. Since the turn of 
the 21st century, water delivery in France and electricity delivery in Germany have increasingly 
been provided by local governments (Hall, Lobina, & Terhorst, 2013). In 2000, 80 percent of 
Germany’s electricity and 75 percent of France’s water was delivered by private companies. 
Since then, five major French water providers, covering about five million people, have been 
taken over by the public with no providers moving to the private sector. In Germany there have 
been 162 re-municipalizations of power companies and none in the opposite direction. In both 
nations, three reasons drove the changes: the expiration of existing private contracts, customer 
mistrust over prices and performance, and the rise of green politicians and sustainability values 
among the populace. 
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Such a radical change is not expected in the United States. One of the most prominent re-
municipalizations in recent years was in Boulder, Colorado as the citizens grew frustrated with 
their investor-owned utility’s unwillingness to align practices with rising sustainability values. 
The debate on whether to take over the electric company was contentious (Driskell, 2012) and 
the transition has been anything but smooth. With costs of municipalization mounting, Boulder 
put the takeover on the ballot again in 2017 – for the third time in seven years. Once again voters 
supported the re-municipalization effort (Burness, 2017). Boulder’s experience demonstrates the 
potential for a community to promote its environmental values with a locally owned utility 
(Crandall, Bailey, Gichon, & Koehn, 2014), although the struggles and costs incurred by one of 
the most progressive cities in the United States does not bode well for other re-municipalization 
efforts.  
Instead, the case for municipal utilities may lie in the unrealized potential of these 
organizations in smaller, under-resourced communities. The Poisson distribution of the 
dependent variables (the counts of sustainability actions) indicates that most of the values are 
low. For the 1,027 places in the sample with a publicly-owned water utility, the median number 
of water sustainability policies is 1 and the mean is 1.4, out of a range of 0 to 6. Similarly, the 
190 communities with a municipal electric company average only 1.6 community-wide energy 
policies with a median of three; and this is out of a possible 17 policies. Despite the results that 
show the importance of publicly-owned utilities as a driver, there are obviously many places 
where the utility is not pushing for sustainability. In these places, the revenues may either go to 
keeping electricity or water costs down (which is a potentially anti-conservation approach) or 
into the general budget to offset other costs of running a government. Local leaders may not 
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recognize the sustainability asset they have, may not care to pursue such an agenda, or have such 
a fragmented governance environment that money and talent cannot be easily repurposed.  
Another possible reason for the lack of action in communities with municipal utilities is 
that promoting sustainability can work against their immediate financial self-interest. Water and 
energy conservation is counter-intuitive when your business is to sell these as products (Homsy, 
2016). The return on investments, for example, in renewable power or grey water re-use systems 
may take too long to be realized.  In many places, the balance of values shifts to economic 
efficiency over sustainability, especially with cash-strapped local governments tapping into the 
utility revenue stream for more traditional community needs.  
The previous point indicates a number of important areas of future research. In places 
with publicly-owned water and public utilities, what drives people to act? Do local leaders or 
citizens push sustainability and see municipal utilities as a vehicle for implementation? Or can 
municipal utilities initiate sustainability actions on their own? What role does the local nature of 
the utility play versus the public ownership? For example, could a local privately-owned utility 
have the same impact? Would a public-private partnership allow community values around 
issues of sustainability to be merged with the efficiencies and capital investment potential of the 
private sector? At the same time, there are a variety of ownership structures of municipal 
utilities. How different might the sustainability actions of those that are municipal departments 
be from those that are standalone authorities or those that have more corporatized operations? 
Another important area of future research is the effectiveness of consumer collective purchasing 
organizations, known as community energy projects, in which the members seek to influence 
environmental and social policies of providers. These have the potential to be broad social 
movements rather than just local efforts (Becker, Kunze, & Vancea, 2017). An evaluation of 
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rural electrical and other cooperatives as representative of community sustainability values (or 
not) is also warranted.  
Such ongoing research is crucial as two major developments are pending. First, in the 
electricity sector, new renewable technologies as well as smart grids or distributed systems 
means that practitioners and scholars will have to soon rethink the operations of utilities and their 
role in communities. With these changes, existing and current industrial operators will jockey for 
power and market position (Hess, 2013). Much of the discussion will likely focus on the tension 
between utilities values and the sustainability values of certain communities. Second, and 
similarly, massive infrastructure investments will be needed to maintain the drinking water 
system in the United States and in other developed countries around the world. There is likely to 
be a push to fund those improvements through private sector operations including public-private 
partnerships, which can be structured numerous ways and which may provide public service 
operations with the investment and technical expertise for needed infrastructure transitions 
(Delmon, 2017). As governments weigh whether or not to bring the private sector deeper into 
utility operations, the calculation must be more than financial. In this paper I have shown that 
important community benefits of municipal ownership can be seen and need to be part of the 
public versus private service delivery discussion. 
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